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ABSTRACT
People’s belief that one or more environmentally friendly items that are added to a set of
conventional items can reduce the total environmental impact of these items (the
negative footprint illusion) could lead to unwanted environmental consequences. An
averaging bias seems to underpin this illusion: people make their estimates based on
the average of the environmental impact produced by the items rather than the
accumulated sum. We report four studies that used various priming manipulations to
explore whether people’s preoccupation to think in terms of an average can be
eliminated by fostering a summative mindset. The results demonstrate that
participants avoid succumbing to the negative footprint illusion when the critical
judgment task is preceded by tasks that engender a summation judgment. Our
evidence indicates that the negative footprint illusion can be tempered when a
primed concept (summation) is used adaptively on subsequent judgments, thereby
correcting for bias in environmental judgments.
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The scientific community agrees that human activity
is one of the main contributors to climate change
and the negative consequences that arise from
this (IPCC, 2015; Oreskes, 2004). Despite people gen-
erally being aware of the ways in which human
activity can influence climate change (Halady &
Rao, 2010), many individuals continue to make
decisions that harm their environment (Sörqvist &
Langeborg, 2019). Psychological science has pro-
vided some key insights into why people make
biased decisions that can impact negatively on the
environment (Gifford, 2011; Sörqvist, 2016).
However, more research is urgently required to
determine the amenability of thought processes to
change (e.g. the correction of biases) as evidence
suggests that the acceleration of climate change
can be reinforced by a collection of different
psychological phenomena, including the single
action bias (Weber, 1997), optimism bias (Beattie
et al., 2017), moral licensing effects (Klöckner et al.,
2013), rebound effects (Binswanger, 2001) and the
negative footprint illusion (Gorissen & Weijters,
2016; Holmgren et al., 2018b; Kabanshi, 2020).
The negative footprint illusion, which is the focus
of the present research, occurs when people incor-
rectly estimate that a combined set of conventional
items and environmentally friendly items has a
lower environmental impact compared to the con-
ventional items alone (i.e. A + B < A). This illusion is
thought to be underpinned by an averaging bias,
that is, people make their estimates based on the
average environmental impact of the items rather
than on the accumulated sum of the environmental
impact of the items (Holmgren et al., 2019; Holmg-
ren et al., 2018a; Sörqvist et al., 2020). For
example, in one study, Holmgren et al. (2018a)
showed that people’s estimates of the environ-
mental impact of a set of conventional buildings
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were higher, compared to a set containing the same
number of conventional buildings in addition to a
number of “green” (energy efficient) buildings.
Clearly, then, the judgment tasks that give rise to
the negative footprint illusion such as the one
used by Holmgren et al. (2018a) warrant the need
for people to invoke a different mindset to that
which they currently deploy when thinking about
the environmental impact of objects. To this end,
the current study set out to explore whether the
negative footprint illusion can be tempered, or
even eliminated, by a manipulation that engenders,
and primes, a different concept (summation) when
participants undertake environmental impact
judgments.
Cognitive biases in the environmental
domain
A number of systematic biases can be observed with
experimental tasks that explore how people reason
about the environment (Engler et al., 2019; van den
Broek & Walker, 2019). For example, climate change
beliefs are influenced by irrelevant information,
such as knowledge of today’s particular tempera-
ture (Zaval et al., 2014), the framing of questions
in terms of whether the wording refers to “global
warming” or “climate change” (Schuldt et al., 2011)
and whether temperature scales are in Celsius or
Fahrenheit (Chan, 2018). In addition, climate
change beliefs are susceptible to anchoring
effects, such as having first been primed with
heat-related words (Joireman et al., 2010).
One reason for these aforementioned biases
appears to relate to the process of “attribute substi-
tution” (e.g. Gilovich et al., 2002), which is the idea
that “when confronted with a difficult question
people often answer an easier one instead, usually
without being aware of the substitution” (Kahne-
man & Frederick, 2002, p. 53). For example, when
asked to judge the energy consumption of appli-
ances such as a fridge or a kettle people overesti-
mate the energy consumption of large appliances
(Cowen & Gatersleben, 2017), underestimate the
energy consumption of small appliances (Baird &
Brier, 1981) and associate a long duration of use
with higher energy consumption (Chisik, 2011, sep-
tember). In these cases, the target attribute that is
central to the difficult question being asked by the
experimenter relates to how much energy an appli-
ance consumes, whereas the heuristic attribute that
is implicitly “substituted” into an easier question
that is formulated by the participant relates to appli-
ance size or duration of appliance use. As the target
attribute and the heuristic attribute are different,
the process whereby the participant substitutes
one for the other will – inevitably – lead to systema-
tic biases (Gilovich et al., 2002). Being susceptible to
these biases may have negative consequences for
the environment, for example, potentially leading
people to overuse products with a high energy
demand because of their small size or to drive for
longer distances because they own a car that is
environmentally friendly.
The latter examples resemble what is called “nega-
tive spillover”. This has been observed in environ-
mental research and can be defined – in the
environmental domain – as when a pro-environ-
mental act decreases the likelihood of additional
pro-environmental behaviours (Truelove et al.,
2014). Negative spillover effects have been widely
found in environmental research. For example, fuel
efficiency is related to increased driving distance
(Matiaske et al., 2012), decreased water use can
result in increased electricity use (Tiefenbeck et al.,
2013) and electric car owners tend to act in a less
environmental friendly manner with respect to other
environmental decisions compared with conven-
tional car owners (Klöckner et al., 2013). The foregoing
examples are related to moral licensing (i.e. acting
immorally after establishing moral credentials; Sach-
deva et al., 2009) and compensatory green beliefs
(e.g. “Not driving a car compensates for flying on
holiday”; Kaklamanou et al., 2015, p. 190).
The negative footprint illusion (Gorissen & Weij-
ters, 2016), seems to be comparable to moral licen-
sing and compensatory green beliefs in certain
respects. As noted, the negative footprint illusion
occurs when people estimate that the environ-
mental impact of conventional objects is greater
compared to the same objects together with envir-
onmentally friendly items (i.e. A + B < A; Holmgren
et al., 2018a). The illusion has been shown with
buildings (Holmgren et al., 2018a, 2018b), food pro-
ducts (Gorissen & Weijters, 2016), cars (Kim &
Schuldt, 2018) and with different time periods of
emission rates (Holmgren et al., 2019). Empirical evi-
dence suggests that the phenomenon is robust,
being immune to both the expertise of the decision
maker (e.g. energy-systems experts also fall prey to
the illusion; Holmgren et al., 2018b) and occurring
both in within-participants designs (e.g. Holmgren
et al., 2018b) and between-participants designs
(e.g. Gorissen & Weijters, 2016).
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In terms of explanations for the negative foot-
print illusion, one study has proposed that compen-
satory green beliefs (e.g. “I recycle, therefore I can
drive my car to work”) are a key predictor of the illu-
sion (MacCutcheon et al., 2020), and evidence
gleaned from two other studies suggest that it is
underpinned by an averaging bias (Holmgren
et al., 2018a; Holmgren et al., 2019). More specifi-
cally, instead of considering each item’s individual
environmental impact and making an estimate
based on the aggregated sum, people seem to
make a vice/virtue categorisation of each item
(e.g. good vs. bad; green vs. conventional) and sub-
sequently make their overall estimates using the
average environmental impact of the items. The
averaging bias also appears to underpin several
other effects found in the psychological literature.
For example, people believe that: (i) when a
healthy side dish is added to a meal, the overall per-
ceived calorie content decreases (Chernev & Gal,
2010); (ii) when adding a weak argument to a
strong argument the persuasiveness of the overall
message decreases (Weaver et al., 2016); and (iii)
when adding a low risk stock to a high risk stock
the overall risk decreases (Kunz et al., 2017).
We view it as possible that many of the effects
that occur in environmental decision making that
we have outlined, such as the negative footprint
illusion, moral licensing and the existence of com-
pensatory green beliefs, have a basis in a
common, underpinning cognitive mechanism that
reflects people’s tendency to privilege an averaging
process over a summation process, whether this
occurs when considering the environmental
impact of a set of presented items (as in the nega-
tive footprint illusion) or when estimating the
environmental impact of one’s own actions (as in
moral licensing). Erroneous reasoning based on an
averaging bias appears to be a fundamental
thought pattern that arises across species (e.g.
with monkeys [Kralik et al., 2012] and dogs [Pattison
& Zentall, 2014]). Moreover, some work has argued
that a bias to engage in an averaging process may
have led to beneficial effects during human evol-
ution. For example, Sörqvist and Langeborg (2019)
argue that the averaging bias may have social
origins that relate to the evolution of cooperative
behaviours for ensuring the restoration of balance
in interpersonal relationships (i.e. having done
something hurtful to a conspecific, one can restore
the balance by doing something virtuous). On the
other hand, when this thought pattern is applied
to address problems that humans are not adapted
to solve (e.g. judgments relating to climate
change), then detrimental consequences may
occur. As the negative footprint illusion seems to
be a robust phenomenon (see Table 1), potentially
influencing decisions that can cause harm to the
environment, it is important to explore the bound-
ary conditions for the occurrence of the illusion as
well as ways to mitigate its occurrence.
Notwithstanding our proposal that an averaging
bias may form the basis of various effects arising in
people’s environment-related judgments, we
concede that it is challenging to determine
whether the cognitive mechanisms that underpin
such biases operate at a more implicit, heuristic
and non-conscious level or at a more explicit, ana-
lytic and conscious level. We allude here to the fun-
damental dual-process distinction that pervades
much contemporary reasoning research (e.g. see
Evans, 2018, for discussion of Type 1 vs. Type 2
thinking; see also De Neys, 2017; Evans & Stanovich,
2013a, 2013b). The current literature on judgmental
biases in environmental reasoning does not provide
clear-cut evidence on the Type 1 or Type 2 basis of
reasoning biases and has, instead, produced confl-
icting findings. In the case of moral licensing, for
example, some studies point to a conscious,motiva-
tional precursor to the effect (Krischer et al., 2010),
whereas other research suggests that moral licen-
sing largely operates beneath people’s conscious
awareness (Khan & Dhar, 2006). Our research does
not tackle this contested issue, although we are
aware that it is a potentially important topic for
further investigation. Instead, the research that we
report here is concerned with the issue of whether
a priming manipulation (whether operating at a
Type 1 or Type 2 level) can mitigate the occurrence
of the negative footprint illusion.
If the negative footprint illusion is underpinned
by an averaging bias, then we propose that it
should be possible to eliminate the effect by first
priming a summative concept. One way to do this,
as examined in the present research, is to ask partici-
pants to undertake an initial judgment task that
taps summation prior to them then tackling the criti-
cal judgment task that typically gives rise to the
negative footprint illusion that is believed to stem
from an averaging process. To clarify, the purpose
of the research reported here was to investigate
whether it is possible to eliminate the negative foot-
print illusion by giving participants a preceding
judgment task in which they make a summative
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judgment (resulting in A + B > A) to see whether the
resulting summative mindset can then facilitate
correct performance for a subsequent judgment
that involves estimating the environmental impact
of a set of conventional objects after environmen-
tally friendly objects have been added to the set.
Throughout this paper we chose petrol and electric
cars as the stimulus material in the critical judgment
task (i.e. the task in which a negative footprint illu-
sion is usually found) as electric cars are generally
good options in terms of climate change impacts
(Cox et al., 2020).
Experiment 1
There is a substantial literature on concept
priming within the context of problem solving,
wherein the concept or principle that is used to
solve one task influences performance on a sub-
sequent task, even if participants do not spon-
taneously make analogies between the tasks
(e.g. Mayer & Wittrock, 1996; Schunn & Dunbar,
1996). For example, in one study where partici-
pants were asked to generate “novel” creatures
(e.g. aliens), the creatures generated had more
hostile features when participants had been
primed with the concept of “hostility” (see
Marsh et al., 1999). Given this literature base,
we expected such concept priming to be possible
in the context of the negative footprint illusion.
In Experiment 1, we expected that a summation
concept used to make a decision in one
judgment task would be primed and thereby
available to influence performance on a sub-
sequent judgment task (i.e. the critical judgment




Participants were 60 students (63% female) who
were recruited by email from various disciplines at
a Swedish university (mean age = 28.52 years, SD
= 10.04). All participants received a small honorar-
ium (i.e. a cinema voucher) for their participation.
Design
A between-participants design was employed with
the summation concept-priming manipulation as
the independent variable with two levels (with vs.
without). The dependent variables were carbon
dioxide emission estimates and carbon footprint
estimates (−10, very low carbon dioxide emission/
footprint; +10, very high carbon dioxide emission/
footprint). The reason why we used carbon
dioxide emission estimates as an additional inde-
pendent variable to the more usual carbon footprint
estimates was to explore whether or not the nega-
tive footprint illusion is sensitive to different depen-
dent measures of environmental impact. The
statistical software used for the analyses was IBM
SPSS Statistics 24. The dataset for Experiment 1 is
provided as supplementary material.
Table 1. A summary of studies that have investigated the existence of a negative footprint illusion, indicating that the


















Buildings × × ×

















Within participants × × ×*
Between participants × × × × ×
Note: *This within-participants experiment did not find a negative footprint illusion.
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Materials and procedure
A paper-pencil questionnaire was used to obtain
data. All participants read a short introduction to
the study stating that it was comprised of questions
regarding the carbon footprint of cars. They were
then given the information that the higher the
carbon footprint, the higher the impact on the
environment and vice versa. Half of the participants
(N = 30) were allocated to the control condition and
were presented with three cars with the appurte-
nant information, stating: “These three blue cars rep-
resent a company’s fleet of cars. Suppose that the
total carbon footprint (due to usage and production)
of the cars is 0 on the scale below”. Participants
were given a reference point of zero on a scale
ranging from –10 to +10 and subsequently pre-
sented with the question:
Imagine that an electric car is added to the com-
pany’s fleet of cars, so that the car fleet now contains
three petrol cars and one electric car. What is the total
carbon footprint (due to usage and production) for
the four cars together, given this information?
They then (starting from the reference point)
made their estimate on a scale ranging from –10
to +10 (endpoints labelled) and thereafter
answered the same question with the exception
that the dependent measure was changed to
carbon dioxide emissions. The type of question
was counterbalanced between participants. More
specifically, half of the participants started with
estimating the carbon dioxide emissions and the
other half started with estimating the carbon
footprint.
Priming Task: The second half of the participants
(N = 30) were allocated to the experimental con-
dition and received the same information and ques-
tions as the first half of participants. However,
before making the same judgments as the first
half of the participants they were given two
additional judgment tasks, stating: “These three elec-
tric cars represent a company’s fleet of cars. Suppose
that the total carbon footprint (due to usage and pro-
duction) of the cars is 0 on the scale below”. Partici-
pants were then given a reference point of zero
on a scale ranging from –10 to +10 and thereafter
were presented with the question:
Imagine that a petrol car is added to the company’s
fleet of cars, so that the car fleet now contains
three electric cars and one petrol car. What is the
total carbon footprint (due to usage and production)
for the four cars together, given this information?
The second judgment task consisted of the same
question but with carbon dioxide emission as the
dependent measure instead of carbon footprint.
The type of question was counterbalanced
between participants. More specifically, half of the
participants started with estimating the carbon
dioxide emissions and the other half started with
estimating the carbon footprint.
This additional task was given to the second half
of the participants to prime a summative concept in
advance of them undertaking the second, critical
judgment task for which the averaging bias invari-
ably manifests. We assumed that this priming task
would result in a higher estimate based on a sum-
mation solution principle (the appropriate method
of estimation), since adding additional conventional
items to an existing set has been shown to increase
the estimated environmental impact in previous
studies (Gorissen & Weijters, 2016; Kim & Schuldt,
2018; Kusch & Fiebelkorn, 2019).
Results and discussion
For all t-tests reported in the results sections of the
current paper, we additionally report the JZS Bayes
factor. This compares the degree to which the data
support the alternative hypothesis (the standar-
dised differences in the means is not zero and is dis-
tributed as a t with 1 degree of freedom) versus the
null hypothesis (there is no difference between the
means). For each comparison, the JZS Bayes Factor
was computed from the t-value using an online cal-
culator (available: http://pcl.missouri.edu/
bayesfactor). Unless stated, the JZS Bayes Factor
reported is in favour of the alternative hypothesis
(H1), as opposed to the null hypothesis (H0).
Priming manipulation
As can be seen in Figures 1 and 2, the ratings within
the priming phase (i.e. adding a petrol car to electric
Figure 1. Carbon footprint estimates given by the partici-
pants in the control condition and experimental condition.
Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.
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cars) were higher than zero for both carbon foot-
print estimates (M = 3.33, SEM = .69), t(29) = 4.81, p
< .001, BF = 557.52, and for carbon dioxide emission
estimates (M = 3.93, SEM = .47), t(29) = 8.38, p < .001,
BF = 3914252. These results were as expected from
previous research (Gorissen & Weijters, 2016; Kim
& Schuldt, 2018), which has shown that adding con-
ventional items to an existing set leads to an
increase in the estimated environmental impact of
the total set. Importantly, the priming manipulation
in Experiment 1 appears to have been successful in
terms of inducing an estimate of environmental
impact that is presumably based on an appropriate,
summative method.
Carbon footprint estimates
As can be seen in Figure 1, the carbon footprint esti-
mate in the control condition was significantly lower
than zero, as confirmed by a one-sample t-test (M =
−1.63, SEM = .79), t(29) =−2.08, p = .047, BF = 1.27,
replicating the negative footprint illusion. In con-
trast, the carbon footprint estimate in the condition
following summative concept priming was higher
than zero, but this difference was not statistically
significant with the conventional alpha threshold
(M = 1.10, SEM = .62), t(29) = 1.77, p = .087, BF = 1.29
(in favour of H0). Nevertheless, the observation
that the carbon footprint estimate in this condition
was higher than zero indicates that the negative
footprint illusion was eliminated. It is worth
noting, too, that the direction of the means
suggests that participants in this latter condition
were making their estimate using a summation
operation. The estimate in the control condition
(M =−1.63, SEM = .79) was significantly lower than
the estimate in the experimental (primed) condition
(M = 1.10, SEM = .62), as confirmed by an indepen-
dent sample t-test, t(58) = 2.73, p = .008, η2 = .12,
BF = 4.10.
Carbon dioxide emission estimates
The results with the carbon footprint estimates were
replicated with the carbon dioxide emissions esti-
mates as the dependent variable, as can be seen
in Figure 2. The carbon dioxide emissions estimate
in the control condition was significantly lower
than zero (M =−1.63, SEM = .65), as confirmed by a
one-sample t-test, t(29) =−2.53, p = .017, BF = 2.87
(replicating the negative footprint illusion), and
lower than the carbon dioxide emissions estimate
in the experimental (primed) condition (M = 0.80,
SEM = .59), as confirmed by an independent
sample t-test, t(58) = 2.77, p = .007, η2 = .12, BF =
4.51. The carbon dioxide emissions estimate in the
experimental condition did not differ significantly
from zero (M = 0.80, SEM = .59), t(29) = 1.35, p
= .188, BF = 2.26 (in favour of H0), again indicating
that the negative footprint illusion was eliminated.
Experiment 2
Experiment 1 has some methodological idiosyncra-
sies that may obscure the conclusions that might
be drawn from it. First, it is possible that the task
that was supposed to induce a summative
mindset can be attributed to the averaging
account as well. That is, in the priming task, the
average environmental impact does, in fact, increase
when one petrol car is added to three “green” cars.
As such, it is unclear whether the priming task in
Experiment 1 genuinely resulted in a summative
mindset. Rather, the priming task could simply
have created an averaging mindset in the opposite
direction. Just as the addition of an environmentally
friendly item to a set of conventional items might
result in a lower estimate (i.e. “downward aver-
aging”), the addition of a conventional item to a
set of environmentally friendly items might simply
result in a higher estimate (i.e. “upward averaging”).
Second, in the control condition respondents
learn that the total carbon footprint of three
petrol cars equals zero on the scale provided.
Thus, it is possible that respondents conceive of
zero as the “average” point when considering
carbon impact on the environment. If participants
learn that three petrol cars is already zero on the
scale, if they are later asked what it would mean if
an electric car was to be added to the fleet, the
carbon footprint could be considered reduced
since an electric car should be lower than zero.
Even though one could make the counter-argument
that an averaging account of the manipulation
Figure 2. Carbon dioxide emission estimates given by the
participants in the control condition and experimental con-
dition. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.
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would not readily explain the observed findings on
the critical judgment task and that prior studies
(Gorissen & Weijters, 2016; Kim & Schuldt, 2018;
Kusch & Fiebelkorn, 2019) demonstrate an increase
of environmental impact estimates when a conven-
tional item is added to an existing set, the afore-
mentioned uncertainties arising from the
methodology adopted in Experiment 1 nevertheless
need to be addressed empirically, which was a key
motivation for the design of Experiment 2.
Before explaining themethodological refinements
that we introduced into Experiment 2 we note a
further concern with Experiment 1, which is that the
dependent measures (i.e. carbon footprint and
carbon dioxide emissions) for the priming task were
the sameas those for the critical judgment task. There-
fore, it is possible that the “domain-specific” overlap
between the measures for the two tasks may have
been influential in driving the priming effect, poten-
tially diminishing the value of this finding for theoreti-
cal advancement. To avoid this issue of domain
specificity and to address the domain-general
nature of a priming effect, the dependent measure
for the priming tasks in Experiment 2 was changed
to that of fuel cost, with requested judgments
being, for example, whether the fuel cost for a car
fleet consisting of three petrol cars will increase
when an electric car is added to the fleet. It should
also be mentioned that it was deemed sufficient in
Experiment 2 (and the experiments reported sub-
sequently) to request only carbon footprint estimates
as the dependent measure in relation to the critical
judgment task, as the negative footprint illusion was
observed for both carbon dioxide emissions and
carbon footprint judgments in Experiment 1.
In Experiment 2 we also wanted to explore
whether the priming effect transcends the types of
objects used in the critical judgment task (i.e. to-
be-estimated items). To this end, in the priming
tasks in Experiment 2 we employed houses (i.e. exist-
ing houses in a residential area and additions of new
houses to the residential area) as well as cars (petrol
and electric) because robust negative footprint illu-
sions have been previously observed using both
types of items (e.g. Holmgren et al., 2018a).
Furthermore, a second priming condition was
added to Experiment 2, which used the same to-
be-estimated items (i.e. either cars or houses) and
the same dependent measure (i.e. fuel cost).
However, instead of asking participants to compute
the sum of the fuel cost when an electric car (or a
new house) was added to conventional items, we
asked them to estimate the average fuel cost when
an electric car (or a new house) was added to the
petrol cars or the existing houses. This new priming
condition involving averaging was included to
address the possibility that a priming condition con-
sisting of any mathematical task relating to how fuel
cost will change might, by itself, be enough to elim-
inate the negative footprint illusion.
Moreover, to increase the likelihood that priming
occurs, we employed six summative priming tasks in
the conditions wherein participants were asked to
make summative fuel cost judgments with cars (here-
inafter known as the “cars summation priming con-
dition”) and houses (hereinafter known as the
“houses summation priming condition”), and six aver-
aging priming tasks in the conditions wherein partici-
pants were asked to make average fuel cost
judgments with cars (hereinafter known as the “cars
averaging priming condition”), and houses (herein-
after known as the “houses averaging priming con-
dition”). This is a key difference from Experiment 1,
where only one priming task was used. Finally, to
address the potential problems that we identified
with the nature of the judgment scale, in particular,
that existing objects were marked at the zero point
on the scale, the mid-point of the scale was now
labelled “current fuel cost” instead of zero and the
scale was shaded from light to dark to represent the
fact that the middle of the scale had an associated
carbon footprint.
We hypothesised that the negative footprint illu-
sion would be eliminated in the summative priming
condition and that the negative footprint illusion
would be present in the averaging priming condition,
because adding a lower value to a set would decrease
the average value. For example, if one were to add an
object (e.g. a car) with a value of 5 on a scale (e.g. fuel
cost for that car) to an existing object (e.g. car) with a
value of 10 on the scale (e.g. fuel cost for that car), the
averagewouldbe7.5,whereas the correct summation
response would be 15 (i.e. 10 + 5, rather than 10 + 5/
2). In each priming condition we also gave the partici-
pants numeric information associated with fuel cost
(e.g. £33) to increase the possibility that they would




A total of 265 participants (67.2% female; mean age
= 34.54, SD = 11.74) took part in Experiment 2 (see
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Table 2 for the different age and gender statistics
across conditions). They all received a small monet-
ary honorarium for their participation. No partici-
pant had taken part in Experiment 1.
Design
A between-participants design was employed with
the independent variable being the type of
priming with two levels (i.e. averaging vs. sum-
mation). The dependent variable in the critical judg-
ment task was the estimate of the carbon footprint
of the total set of presented items. The data were
collected by using the Prolific Academic crowdsour-
cing platform to run the online questionnaire that
presented the priming tasks and the critical judg-
ment task. Key inclusion criteria concerned the
need for participants to have been born and be
living in the U.K., have English as their first language
and have no literacy difficulties. Another inclusion
criterion related to the requirement for the partici-
pant to provide a correct answer to each priming
task in each condition. The rationale for this was
that we wanted to explore whether a summation
concept (or an averaging concept, depending on
the condition) that was used to make a decision in
one judgment task could be primed and thereby
available to influence performance on a subsequent
judgment task (i.e. the critical judgment task in
which a negative footprint illusion is usually
found). We note that 56 participants failed to give
a correct judgment in the priming tasks and were
therefore excluded from the analyses. The full
dataset for Experiment 2 is provided as supplemen-
tary material, with the excluded participants clearly
identified. The statistical software used for the ana-
lyses was IBM SPSS Statistics 24.
Materials and Procedure
Critical judgment task. Before describing the
different priming tasks, we will describe the critical
judgment task used in all experiments and con-
ditions hereafter. For the critical judgment tasks par-
ticipants first read information stating:
In this section you will see pictures that represent a
company’s car pool. Your task is to estimate how
the total carbon footprint changes when more
cars has been added the company car fleet. Read
the information carefully before making your
estimates.
Then they were presented with three cars with the
appurtenant information, stating: “These three blue
cars represent a company’s fleet of cars. Suppose
that the total carbon footprint (due to usage and pro-
duction) of the cars is marked on the scale below as
current carbon footprint”. They were given a refer-
ence point stating “current carbon footprint” on the
centre of a scale ranging from “largest possible
decrease in carbon footprint” to “largest possible
increase in carbon footprint” and subsequently pre-
sented with the question:
Imagine that an electric car is added to the com-
pany’s fleet of cars, so that the car fleet now contains
three petrol cars and one electric car. How does the
total carbon footprint (due to usage and production)
of the car fleet change when the electric car has been
added?
They then (starting from the reference point) made
their estimate. It is important to note that the scale
ranged from −10 to +10, with zero as the midpoint.
However, the numbers on the scale were invisible to
the participants.
The cars summation priming condition. Before
receiving the critical judgment task described
above, the participants in the cars summation
priming condition read a short introduction to the
study stating:
In this section you will see pictures that represent a
company’s car pool. Your task is to estimate how
the total fuel cost changes when more cars have
been added to the company car fleet. Read the infor-
mation carefully before making your estimates.
When they had read this statement, they continued
to the first priming task, which stated: “The 3 blue
cars represent the cars in an existing car pool. The
total monthly fuel cost for the 3 petrol cars is £414
and is marked on the scale below as ‘current total
fuel cost’”. This text was accompanied by a picture
with three blue petrol cars (see Figure 3), and a
centred marking on a scale labelled “current total
fuel cost”.
Participants were then presented with this infor-
mation and question:
Imagine that 1 electric car is added to the existing car
fleet so that the car fleet now consists of 3 petrol cars
Table 2. Mean age in years (and SD) of the participants in
each condition in Experiment 2, also showing the
percentage of female participants across conditions.
Priming condition N Mean age (SD) % Female
Cars summation 63 34.02 (11.45) 61.9%
Houses summation 59 33.81 (12.44) 71.2%
Cars averaging 79 37.05 (11.95) 68.4%
Houses averaging 64 32.61 (10.82) 67.2%
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and 1 electric car. The monthly fuel cost for one elec-
tric car is £33. How does the totalmonthly fuel cost of
the car fleet change when the electric car has been
added?
This text was accompanied by a picture with
three blue petrol cars (see Figure 3) together with
a green electric car (see Figure 4). The participants
were also presented with an information box,
which provided them with the specific fuel cost
for one electric car and for one petrol car. Then
they were asked to make their estimate on a scale
labelled on the left as “very large decrease in total”
and on the right as “very high increase in total”.
The reference point was from the centre of the
scale indicating “current fuel cost”.
Participants were then asked to respond to five
more priming tasks, with the only thing changing
from the one above being the number of cars and
their appurtenant current fuel cost (see Table 3;
the order of the priming tasks was randomised
between participants). After responding to the
priming tasks participants were then asked to
respond to the critical judgment task.
The cars averaging priming condition. The ques-
tionnaire used in the cars averaging priming con-
dition was identical to that used in the cars
summation priming condition, with the following
exception: before receiving the critical judgment
task, the participants who were responding to the
priming tasks in this condition were asked to esti-
mate the change of the average fuel cost per car
instead of the total fuel cost of all the cars in the
car fleet.
The houses summation priming condition. Before
receiving the critical judgment task, the participants
in the houses summation priming condition read a
short introduction to the study stating: “In this
section you will see pictures that represent a residen-
tial area. Your task is to estimate how the total
monthly fuel costs changes when new families have
moved in. Read the information carefully before
making your estimates”. When they had read this
statement, they continued to the first priming
task. The priming tasks first gave the participants
the information:
The 3 blue houses represent the current inhabited
households in a residential area. The total monthly
fuel cost (by fuel cost we mean costs as a result of
heating, electricity and gas etc.) of the 3 current
households is £315 and is marked on the scale
below as ‘current total fuel cost’.
This text was accompanied with a picture with three
blue conventional houses (see Figure 5), and a
centred marking on a scale labelled “current total
fuel cost”.
Participants were then presented with this infor-
mation and question:
Imagine that 1 new family is moving into the residen-
tial area so that the residential area now consists of 3
old households and 1 new household. The total
monthly fuel costs of 1 new household is £80. How
does the monthly fuel costs change in total in the
residential area when 1 new family has moved in?
This text was accompanied with a picture with three
existing houses (see Figure 5) together with an
additional new house (see Figure 6). The partici-
pants were also presented with an information
Figure 4. The graphic used to depict a single electric car.
The number of cars displayed to participants corresponded
with the information described in each method section.
Figure 3. The graphic used to depict a single petrol car.
The number of cars displayed to participants corresponded
with the information described in each method section.
Table 3. The number of petrol cars and electric cars in the
six priming tasks across conditions.
Number of cars in the six priming tasks
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box, which provided them with the specific fuel cost
for one new house and for one existing house. Then
they were asked to make their estimate on a scale
labelled from on the left as “very large decrease in
total” and on the right as “very high increase in
total”. The reference point was from the centre of
the scale indicating “current fuel cost”. The scale
ranged from −10 to +10, with zero as the midpoint,
but these values were not visible to participants.
Participants were then asked to respond to five
more priming tasks, with the only thing changing
from the one above being the number of houses
and their appurtenant current fuel cost (see
Table 4; the order of the priming tasks was
randomised between participants). After respond-
ing to all six of the priming tasks, participants
were asked to respond to the critical judgment task.
The houses averaging priming condition. The
questionnaire used in the houses averaging
priming condition was identical to that used in the
houses summation priming condition, with the fol-
lowing exception: before receiving the critical judg-
ment task, the participants who were responding to
the priming tasks in this condition were asked to
estimate the change of the average fuel cost per
house instead of the total fuel cost of all the
houses in the residential area.
Results and discussion
Priming manipulation
As can be seen in Table 5, the responses in the
priming phase of each condition were significantly
different from zero, as shown by one-sample t-
tests. More specifically, participants in the cars
(and houses) summation priming condition esti-
mated that adding one or several electric car/s (or
new additional house/s) would increase the
current fuel cost in total. In contrast, the participants
in the cars (and houses) averaging priming con-
dition estimated that adding one or several electric
car/s (or an new additional house/s) would decrease
the current fuel cost on average, per car (or house).
These responses suggest that the priming
Figure 5. The graphic used to depict a single existing
house in the residential area. The number of houses dis-
played to participants corresponded with the information
described in each method section.
Figure 6. The graphic used to depict a single new
additional house in the residential area. The number of
houses displayed to participants corresponded with the
information described in each method section.
Table 4. The number of existing houses and additional
new houses in the six priming tasks across conditions.
Number of houses in the six priming tasks







Table 5. Manipulation check for each priming condition in
Experiment 2, showing the mean response (and SE) when
fuel cost is the dependent measure.
Priming condition
Mean fuel cost estimate
(SE) t Cohen’s d
Cars summation 1.72 (.12) 13.99** 1.98
Houses
summation
3.10 (.25) 12.49** 2.09
Cars averaging −3.90 (.25) 15.63** 1.77
Houses averaging −2.81 (.20) 13.71** 1.88
Note: ** = p < .001.
The t values derive from one-sample t-tests comparing estimates
against zero (effect sizes measured by Cohen’s d).
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manipulation in Experiment 2 successfully induced
an appropriate method of calculation: either sum-
mation or averaging.
Carbon footprint estimates
A univariate analysis of variance was conducted
with type of priming (summation vs. averaging) as
the independent variable. The analysis revealed a
significant difference between conditions, F(3,205)
= 11.57, p < .001, ηp
2 = .15 (see Figure 7).
Post hoc one-sample t-tests revealed that carbon
footprint estimates for the critical judgment task in
both the cars (M = 0.52, SEM = .32) and houses (M =
0.02, SEM = .32) summation priming conditions did
not differ significantly from zero, t(49) = 1.61, p
= .113, BF = 1.95 (in favour of H0) and t(49) = 0.06,
p = .955, BF = 6.49 (in favour of H0), respectively.
As such, these summation priming conditions did
not give rise to a negative footprint illusion, which
we contend is evidence that summation priming
can eliminate the bias to use an averaging approach
in generating a carbon footprint estimate on the
critical judgment task. We acknowledge that sum-
mation priming did not engender normatively
“correct” responding, which would have been
demonstrated convincingly had carbon footprint
estimates been significantly greater than zero.
Nevertheless, we would argue that although partici-
pants were not making strictly accurate estimates
on the critical judgment task it is still the case that
the typical negative footprint illusion was
eliminated.
With respect to participants’ carbon footprint
ratings after responding to the averaging
priming tasks, post hoc one-sample t-tests
revealed that these judgments were significantly
lower than zero, indicating the presence of a
negative footprint illusion. This was true both
for the cars averaging priming condition (M =
−1.73, SEM = .25), t(55) = 6.99, p < .001, BF =
3019563 and for the houses averaging priming
condition (M =−1.36, SEM = .34), t(52) = 3.95, p
< .001, BF = 102.87. These later results suggest
that priming an averaging mindset aligns with
people’s standard bias to use an averaging
approach in generating a carbon footprint esti-
mate on the critical judgment task.
It is worth noting, too, that the direction of the
means when comparing the summation priming
conditions to the averaging priming conditions
further supports the view that participants were,
indeed, making their estimates using a summation
operation in the former conditions whereas they
were using averaging in the latter conditions. We
finally note that the comparable estimates that
arose in the critical judgment tasks for the two sum-
mation priming conditions that used very different
priming items (i.e. houses vs. cars). This similarity
in performance irrespective of the nature of the
priming items is suggestive of a domain-general
priming effect. This proposal is likewise supported
by the very similar estimates that arose in the critical
judgment tasks for the two averaging priming con-
ditions that also used distinct items (i.e. houses vs.
cars).
Experiment 3
Experiment 2 successfully addressed some of the
methodological issues that arose in the context of
Experiment 1, including: (1) the concern that the
priming task in Experiment 1 could have been
tackled using an averaging process rather than the
intended summation process; (2) the worry that
the scale that was used for the critical judgment
task in Experiment 1 was centred to zero; and (3)
the possibility that there may have been a
domain-specific element to any priming effects
observed in Experiment 1 given that cars were the
items used in both the priming manipulation and
in the critical judgment task. Despite these
strengths of Experiment 2, however, we note a
further methodological issue that related to the
fact that the dependent measure used in the
priming tasks was that of fuel cost. It is possible
that fuel cost might be perceived to be in the
same “domain” as carbon footprint, since fuel is
intrinsically related to carbon footprint. As such,
Experiment 2 may not have fully eradicated a
domain-specific component to the priming effects
observed such that it is not possible to be totally
Figure 7. Carbon footprint estimates for all priming con-
ditions in Experiment 2. Error bars represent the standard
error of the mean.
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confident that the priming manipulation operates in
a fully domain-general manner.
To address this latter issue, the present exper-
iment was aimed at replicating Experiment 2, but
this time using “income” as the dependent
measure in the priming tasks instead of fuel cost.
We hypothesised that the negative footprint illusion
would, once again, be eliminated in the summative
priming conditions but that the illusion would still
be present in the averaging priming conditions.
Method
Participants
A total of 319 participants (67.4% female; mean age
= 34.98, SD = 12.39) took part in Experiment 3 (see
Table 6 for the different age and gender statistics
across conditions). They all received a small monet-
ary honorarium for their participation. No partici-
pant had taken part in Experiment 1 or
Experiment 2.
Design
The design of the experiment was identical in all
respects to that employed in Experiment 2 and
involved a between-participants manipulation
that reflected type of priming with two levels
(i.e. averaging vs. summation). The dependent
variable in the critical judgment task was again
the estimate of the carbon footprint of the total
set of presented items. Data were collected
through an online questionnaire via Prolific Aca-
demic and equivalent exclusion criteria were
employed to those in Experiment 2. We note
that 116 participants failed to give a correct judg-
ment in the priming tasks and were therefore
excluded from the analyses. The full dataset for
Experiment 3 is provided as supplementary
material, with the excluded participants clearly
identified. The dataset for Experiment 3 is pro-
vided as supplementary material. The statistical
software used for the analyses was IBM SPSS Stat-
istics 24.
Materials and procedure
Critical judgment task. The critical judgment task was
identical to that used in Experiment 2.
The cars summation priming condition. Before
receiving the critical judgment task, the participants
in the cars summation priming condition first read a
short introduction to the study stating:
In this section you will see pictures that represent a
company’s car pool. Your task is to estimate how
the total income of the company changes when
more cars have been added to the company’s car
fleet. Read the information carefully before making
your estimates.
When they had read this statement, they continued
to the first priming task. The priming tasks first gave
the participants the information: “The 3 blue cars
represent a rental company’s car fleet. The total
monthly income of the rental company from the 3
petrol cars is £3,900 and is marked on the scale
below as ‘current income in total’”. This text was
accompanied by a picture with three blue petrol
cars (see Figure 3), and a centred marking on a
scale labelled “current income in total”.
Participants were then presented with this infor-
mation and question:
Imagine that 1 electric car is added to the company’s
existing car fleet so that the car fleet now consists of 3
petrol cars and 1 electric car. The total monthly
income for 1 electric car in the rental company is
£920. How does the company’s monthly income
change in total when 1 new electric car has been
added?
This text was accompanied by a picture with
three blue petrol cars (see Figure 3) together with
a green electric car (see Figure 4). The participants
were also presented with an information box,
which provided them with the specific income gen-
erated by one electric car and by one petrol car.
Then they were asked to make their estimate on a
scale labelled on the left as “very large decrease in
total” and on the right as a “very high increase in
total”. The reference point was from the centre of
the scale indicating “current income in total”.
Participants were then asked to respond to five
more priming tasks, with the only thing changing
from the one above being the number of cars and
their appurtenant current income (the order of the
priming tasks was randomised between
Table 6. Mean age in years (including SD) of the
participants in each condition in Experiment 3, also
showing the percentage of female participants across
conditions.
Priming condition N Mean age (SD) % Female
Cars summation 55 35.20 (12.57) 69.1%
Houses summation 96 32.84 (12.54) 68.8%
Cars averaging 109 36.55 (12.23) 66.1%
Houses averaging 59 35.37 (12.07) 66.1%
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participants). After responding to all six of the
priming tasks, participants were then asked to
respond to the critical judgment task.
The cars averaging priming condition. The ques-
tionnaire used in the cars averaging priming con-
dition was the same as the cars summation
priming condition with one exception: before
receiving the critical judgment task, the participants
in the priming tasks were asked to estimate the
change of the average income per car instead of
the total income of all the cars in the car fleet.
The houses summation priming condition. Before
receiving the critical judgment task, the participants
in the houses summation priming condition read a
short introduction to the study stating: “In this
section you will see pictures that represent a residen-
tial area. Your task is to estimate how the total
monthly income changes when new families have
moved in. Read the information carefully before
making your estimates”. When they had read this
statement, they continued to the first priming
task. The priming tasks first gave the participants
the information: “The 3 blue houses represent the
current inhabited households in a residential area.
The total monthly income of the 3 current households
is £7,350 and is marked on the scale below as ‘current
income in total’”. This text was accompanied by a
picture with three blue conventional houses (see
Figure 5), and a centred marking on a scale labelled
“current income in total”.
Participants were then presented with this infor-
mation and question:
Imagine that 1 new family is moving into the residen-
tial area so that the residential area now consists of 3
old households and 1 new household. The monthly
income of the one new household is £1,862. How
does the monthly income change in total in the resi-
dential area when the new family has moved in?
This text was accompanied by a picture with three
existing houses (see Figure 5) together with a new
additional house (see Figure 6). The participants
were also presented with an information box,
which provided them with the specific monthly
income for one new house and for one existing
house. Then they were asked to make their estimate
on a scale labelled on the left as “very large decrease
in total” and on the right as “very high increase in
total”. The reference point was from the centre of
the scale indicating “current income in total”.
Participants were then asked to respond to five
more priming tasks, the only thing changing from
the one above was the number of houses and
their appurtenant current income (the order of the
priming tasks were randomised between partici-
pants). After responding to all six of the priming
tasks, participants were asked to respond to the
critical judgment task.
The houses averaging priming condition. The
questionnaire used in the houses averaging
priming condition was identical to that used in the
houses summation priming condition, with the fol-
lowing exception: before receiving the critical judg-
ment task, the participants who were responding to
the priming tasks in this condition were asked to
estimate the change of the average income per
house instead of the total income of all the houses
in the residential area.
Results and discussion
Priming manipulation
As can be seen in Table 7, the responses in the
priming phase of each condition were significantly
different from zero, as shown by one-sample t-
tests. More specifically, participants in the cars
(and houses) summation priming condition esti-
mated that adding one or several electric car/s (or
new additional house/s) would increase the
current income in total. In contrast, the participants
in the cars (and houses) averaging priming con-
dition estimated that adding one or several electric
car/s (or new additional house/s) would decrease
the current average income, per car (or house).
These responses suggest that the priming manipu-
lation in Experiment 3 successfully induced an
appropriate method of calculation, that is, either
summation or averaging.
Carbon footprint estimates
A univariate analysis of variance was conducted
with type of priming (summation vs. averaging) as
the independent variable. The analysis revealed a
Table 7. Manipulation check for each priming condition in
Experiment 3, showing the mean response (and SE) when
income is the dependent measure.
Priming condition
Mean income estimate
(SE) t Cohen’s d
Cars summation 3.63 (.22) 16.53** 2.34
Houses
summation
2.71 (.21) 12.67** 1.79
Cars averaging −2.75 (.23) 12.01** 1.67
Houses averaging −3.16 (.24) 13.43** 1.92
Note: ** = p < .001.
The t values derive from one-sample t-tests comparing estimates
against zero (effect sizes measured by Cohen’s d)
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significant difference between conditions, F(3,199)
= 8.25, p < .001, ηp
2 = .11 (see Figure 8).
Post hoc one-sample t-tests revealed that carbon
footprint estimates for the critical judgment task in
both the cars (M = 0.08, SEM = .27) and houses (M =
0.04, SEM = .39) summation priming conditions did
not differ significantly from zero, t(49) = 0.30, p
= .768, BF = 6.23 (in favour of H0) and t(50) = 0.10, p
= .920, BF = 6.53 (in favour of H0), respectively.
These results replicate what was observed in Exper-
iment 2 for these conditions. We again suggest that
the absence of a negative footprint in the summation
priming conditions can be taken as evidence that the
illusion was eliminated, albeit with the participants
still failing to make a strictly correct response.
With respect to participants’ carbon footprint
ratings after responding to the averaging priming
tasks, post hoc one-sample t-tests replicated what
was observed in Experiment 2, with these judg-
ments being significantly lower than zero, indicat-
ing the presence of a negative footprint illusion.
This was the case for both for the cars averaging
priming condition (M =−1.38, SEM = .22), t(51) =
6.45, p < .001, BF = 334915.4, and for the houses
averaging priming condition (M =−1.40, SEM
= .27), t(49) = 5.19, p < .001, BF = 4466.95.
In sum, the results of Experiment 3 fully replicate
what was observed in Experiment 2, despite the use
of a domain-general dependent measure in the
priming tasks (i.e. income) that did not overlap
with the dependent measure used in the critical
judgment tasks (i.e. carbon footprint). As such, the
findings in Experiment 3 appear to lend good
support for a domain-general account of the value
of summative priming for the elimination of the
negative footprint illusion.
Experiment 4
Experiments 1–3 used “active” priming conditions in
that participants were required to undertake
specific summation or averaging operations to
promote a corresponding summation or averaging
mindset. It is possible, however, that merely
requesting participants to engage in any kind of
active thinking activity prior to making a critical
judgment could bias reasoning performance. To
this end, a neutral priming task was adopted in
Experiment 4 to rule out the possibility that enga-
ging in any kind of active thinking could impact
responses on the critical judgment task.
This new priming task used in Experiment 4 was
fashioned on the assumption that although it
involved active thinking it would be unlikely to
evoke any kind of mathematical reasoning and
associated mindset. Therefore, engaging with the
task should have no influence over the carbon foot-
print estimates on the critical judgment task
wherein the negative footprint illusion typically
occurs. The neutral priming task deployed involved
participants making a decision concerning the
colour of presented cars (hereinafter known as the
“neutral cars condition”) or houses (hereinafter
known as the “neutral houses condition”). As this
type of task (e.g. deciding the colours of cars or
houses) does not, arguably, evoke any kind of math-
ematical mindset, we hypothesised that the nega-
tive footprint illusion would persist in both the
neutral houses and neutral cars conditions.
Method
Participants
A total of 102 participants (62% female; mean age =
31.56, SD = 11.05) took part in Experiment 4 (see
Table 8 for the different age and gender statistics
across the two conditions). They all received a
small monetary honorarium for their participation.
No participant had taken part in Experiment 1,
Experiment 2 or Experiment 3.
Design
The design of the experiment was very similar to
that of Experiments 2 and 3 and involved a
between participants manipulation that reflected
Figure 8. Carbon footprint estimates for all priming con-
ditions in Experiment 3. Error bars represent the standard
error of the mean.
Table 8. Mean age in years (including SD) of the
participants in the two condition in Experiment 4, also
showing the percentage of female participants across
conditions.
N Mean age (SD) % Female
Neutral cars condition 52 30.15 (11.22) 67%
Neutral houses condition 50 33.06 (10.77) 56%
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two levels of neutral priming that either related to
the colour of cars or the colour of houses. The
dependent variable in the critical judgment task
was again the estimate of the carbon footprint of
the total set of presented items. Data were collected
through an online questionnaire via Prolific Aca-
demic and equivalent exclusion criteria were
employed to those in Experiment 2 and Experiment
3. Note that the participants in this experiment
could not give an incorrect response. Therefore,
none of the participants were excluded from the
analysis. The statistical software used for the ana-
lyses was IBM SPSS Statistics 24.
Materials and procedure
Critical judgment task. The critical judgment task was
identical to that used in Experiments 2 and 3.
The neutral cars priming condition. Before receiv-
ing the critical judgment task, the participants in
the neutral cars priming condition first read a
short introduction to the study stating: “In this
section you will see pictures that represent a com-
pany’s car pool. Your task is to decide the color of
new cars added to the company’s car pool. Read the
information carefully before making your estimates”.
When they had read this statement, they continued
to the first priming task. The priming tasks first gave
the participants the information: “The 3 blue cars
represent the cars in an existing carpool. The current
blue colour of the cars is centered on the scale
below”. This text was accompanied with a picture
with three blue petrol cars (see Figure 5), and a
centred marking on a scale labelled “current blue
colour”. Then they were presented with this infor-
mation and question:
Imagine that 1 electric car is added to the existing car
fleet so that the car fleet now consists of 3 petrol cars
and 1 electric car. An advertising company has come
up with different colour alternatives for the electric
car. For the physical appearance of the car fleet,
what do you think the colour of the new car should
be?
This text was accompanied with a picture with three
petrol cars (see Figure 5) together with a colourless
(i.e. grey) car. Then they were asked to make their
estimate on a scale labelled on the left as “a very
light blue” and on the right as “a very dark blue”.
The reference point was from the centre of the
scale indicating “current blue colour”. Participants
were then asked to respond to five more priming
tasks, the only thing changing from the one above
being the number of cars (the order of the
priming tasks was randomised between partici-
pants). After responding to all of the priming tasks
participants were asked to respond to the critical
judgment task.
The neutral houses priming condition. The ques-
tionnaire used in the neutral houses priming con-
dition was the same as for the neutral cars
priming condition, with the only exception being
that before receiving the critical judgment task the
participants in the priming tasks were asked to
decide the colour of houses in a residential area.
Results and discussion
Carbon footprint estimates
The participants were susceptible to the negative
footprint illusion both after responding to the
priming tasks in the neutral cars condition (M =
−1.37, SEM = .42), t(51) = 3.23, p = .002, BF = 14.10,
and in the neutral houses condition (M =−1.12,
SEM = .41), t(49) = 2.71, p = .009, BF = 4.02, as
demonstrated by one-sample t-tests.
The results arising in Experiment 4 indicate that
the negative footprint illusion is robust for priming
tasks that involve actively thinking about identical
objects and arrays to those used in Experiments 2
and 3, but which do not involve any mathematical
reasoning. Further, the results suggest that
responding to any judgment task prior to respond-
ing to the critical judgment task in which the nega-
tive footprint illusion is usually found is not enough
to eliminate or even temper the illusion.1 The
findings further reinforce the argument that the
summative and averaging priming conditions in
Experiment 2 and 3 successfully induced summative
and averaging mindsets.
General discussion
When viewed together, the series of experiments
reported in this paper demonstrate that the nega-
tive footprint illusion can be eliminated when the
1To make sure the participants were not biased to respond on the left side of the scale, we recruited 20 participants (who had not participated in
Experiment 1, 2, 3 or 4) to complete the “cars averaging priming condition” (with car fuel cost as the dependent measure), but with the scale
reversed for the critical judgment task (i.e. the right side indicated a decrease of carbon footprint and the left side indicated an increase). The
results demonstrating the presence of a significant negative footprint illusion were replicated (p < .001), indicating that participants had read and
understood the task.
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primed concept of summation is used adaptively on
subsequent judgments, thereby correcting for
biased judgments in environmental reasoning. Fur-
thermore, the reported studies also: (1) replicate the
existence of a negative footprint illusion with con-
ventional and electric cars as the items on which
judgments are made (Experiment 1–4); (2) demon-
strates that the illusion is insensitive to different
dependent measures of environmental impact (i.e.
carbon footprint estimates vs. carbon dioxide emis-
sions estimates; Experiment 1); and (3) suggest that
the illusion still arises when participants are able
explicitly to compare the set of only conventional
items with the combined set of “green” and conven-
tional objects (Experiments 1–4).
The negative footprint illusion can accelerate
climate change as people think that green objects
can compensate for conventional objects (Holmg-
ren et al., 2018b; Sörqvist & Langeborg, 2019), for
example, by adding green products to one’s shop-
ping basket to compensate for the conventional
products. In extant research on the negative foot-
print illusion, only one out of eleven experiments
have failed to demonstrate the illusion (Gorissen &
Weijters, 2016, Study 4), suggesting that it is a
highly robust phenomenon (see Table 1). This war-
rants the need for further studies to explore the
boundary conditions for the emergence of illusion.
The current studies constitute an attempt to
address this gap in the literature.
In the current research, we report the elimination
of the negative footprint illusion following exposure
to a problem for which a summative concept is
engendered. One possible explanation for the eradi-
cation of the negative footprint illusion in this
setting is that of problem-solving transfer, which
occurs when “a person uses previous problem
solving experience to devise a solution for a new
problem” (Mayer & Wittrock, 1996, p. 47). Mayer
and Wittrock (1996) make a distinction between
two types of problem-solving transfer, a low and a
high road. The latter is conscious, controlled and
effortful, whereas the former is non-conscious, auto-
matic, and effortless. If the high road was at work in
the present experiments then the participants in the
priming conditions would consciously use the infor-
mation or processes employed in the preceding
judgment task to make the correct estimate (i.e. A
+ B > A). In contrast, if the low road underpinned
the correct judgment, the process would be non-
conscious and automatic. This corresponds with
Wertheimer’s (1945/1959) view of the generality of
transfer, which specifies that people who have
solved a specific problem can use the same principle
(e.g. A + B > A) on a different problem. This, particu-
larly, chimes with the cars and houses summation
priming conditions in Experiment 2 and Experiment
3 as the dependent measures in the priming tasks
that were used in those experiments differed from
the dependent measure used in the critical judg-
ment task.
The different types of problem-solving transfer
that we have described correspond to the view
that there are two “families” of cognitive operations
(e.g. Gilbert, 1999), which were traditionally referred
to as “intuition” and “reason”, but which are desig-
nated as being “Type 1” and “Type 2” processes in
contemporary dual-process theories (e.g. Evans,
2018; Evans & Stanovich, 2013a, 2013b). According
to Evans and Stanovich’s (2013a, 2013b) framework,
Type 1 processes that are intuitive, heuristic and
associative are defined in terms of being relatively
undemanding of working-memory resources and
autonomous, running to completion whenever a
relevant cue triggers them. In contrast, Type 2 pro-
cesses are deliberative, analytic and controlled and
defined in terms of requiring working-memory
resources and being focused on hypothetical think-
ing. Type 2 processes also tend to be slow, capacity
limited, conscious and serial.
Furthermore, it is generally accepted that Type 1
processes are more prone to biases compared to
Type 2 processes, although the latter are by no
means immune to such biases, which can arise
from a variety of factors, including the application
of defective analytic operations (e.g. Evans, 2018;
Evans & Stanovich, 2013a, 2013b). As such, whilst
it is entirely possible that Type 1 intuitive processes
underpin the negative footprint illusion and that
Type 2 analytic processes underpin correct judg-
ments, it is far too premature to make a definitive
assessment in this respect. One strength of our
priming manipulations (particularly the “summative
mindset” one) is that it could be conceived of as
training the Type 1 system to engage in the “right”
kind of processing from the outset. Thus, there is
no need to trigger a potentially error-prone Type 2
analytic system. The priming manipulations here
align closely with those observed in “nudge
theory” whereby cues (typically within the environ-
ment) are provided to unconsciously drive decisions
(e.g. Linder et al., 2018; Rosenthal & Linder, 2021).
Decisive evidence on the role of Type 1 and Type
2 processes in driving reasoning biases
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underpinning the genesis of the negative footprint
illusion remains an important area for further inves-
tigation, as does the exploration of alternative ways
to eliminate the negative footprint illusion from
people’s estimates in relation to environmental
impacts.
One explanation for the negative footprint illu-
sion that has been suggested in previous
research is that it might arise as a result of posi-
tive reactions to environmentally friendly stimuli,
which in turn spill over on subsequent judgment
tasks (Kim & Schuldt, 2018). This explanation is
closely related to the “affect heuristic” (i.e.
making a judgment based on the overall affect
that the stimulus produces; Slovic et al., 2007),
and such an explanation might seem reasonable
as a preference bias exists for eco-friendly pro-
ducts (e.g. Sörqvist et al., 2013). However, the
results presented in the current paper suggest
that an averaging bias is a more fitting expla-
nation of the illusion. If the negative footprint
illusion was due to positive reactions to environ-
mentally friendly stimuli, then there is reason to
believe that the priming manipulations (especially
in Experiments 2 and 3) would be ineffective.
More specifically, when arriving at the critical
judgment task (i.e. the carbon footprint judg-
ment) in Experiment 2 and 3, the environmentally
friendly stimulus (i.e. the electric car) should still
elicit positive reactions. Furthermore, previous
research suggests that the affect heuristic may
contribute to the negative footprint illusion,
although independently from processes that can
be ascribed to “cold cognition” (Holmgren et al.,
2019). This, together with previous research on
the negative footprint illusion (Holmgren et al.,
2018a; Holmgren et al., 2019) as well as research
showing similar effects to the illusion (e.g.
Chernev & Gal, 2010; Seta & Seta, 2020), argues
for the mechanism that underpins the illusion
as being one that involves an averaging bias. It
should also be mentioned that people rate envir-
onmentally friendly objects as having a greater
carbon footprint compared to zero impact
objects, so the effect cannot arise simply
because they think the “green” objects have no
net effect on the environment (Andersson et al.,
submitted).
One shortcoming of the present research is that
the summative priming tasks did not help the par-
ticipants to make normatively correct responses
on the critical judgment tasks. To be clear, the
correct response to the addition of an electric car
to three petrol cars would be a significant increase
in the total carbon footprint of the set of objects.
As the negative footprint illusion is characterised
by a significant negative difference from zero, we
argue that this particular illusion was eliminated.
However, as the responses in the summative
priming conditions were not significantly different
from zero (in either a positive or negative direction)
then a “zero footprint illusion” appears to have pre-
vailed. Therefore, as can be seen in Table 9, it is not
unreasonable to assume that such a zero footprint
illusion manifests when a higher proportion of
people correctly use summation and a lower pro-
portion of people incorrectly use averaging, com-
pared to when people respond to the critical
judgment task without or with neutral priming. It
should also be mentioned that it seems that the
summation priming conditions in both Experiment
2 and 3 made people more susceptible to the zero
Table 9. Percentages of participants susceptible to the negative footprint illusion and the zero footprint illusion and
percentage of participants that was not susceptible to either illusion (i.e. responding correctly).
Experiments and conditions Negative footprint illusion Zero footprint illusion No illusion
Experiment 2
Cars summation 20% 20% 60%
Houses summation 44% 16% 40%
Cars averaging 79% 7% 14%
Houses averaging 66% 4% 30%
Experiment 3
Cars summation 40% 14% 46%
Houses summation 43% 18% 39%
Cars averaging 77% 6% 17%
Houses averaging 64% 18% 18%
Experiment 4
Neutral cars 60% 10% 30%
Neutral houses 46% 14% 40%
Note that Experiment 2 used a priming task in which fuel cost was the dependent measure, whereas Experiment 3 used a priming task in which
income was the dependent measure.
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footprint illusion. Thus, a more cautious interpret-
ation of our results might be that the summative
priming conditions demoted the negative footprint
illusion to a zero footprint illusion.
Furthermore, in the present paper we used sum-
mation and averaging as the concepts for priming
the critical judgment task, as well as using a
neutral priming concept in Experiment 4. Sum-
mation arguably eliminated the negative footprint
illusion, whereas the averaging priming conditions
demonstrated a negative footprint illusion,
suggesting that the illusion cannot be eliminated
by a mathematical task per se. However, as the illu-
sion is suggested to be underpinned by an aver-
aging bias, which is the outcome of a vice/virtue
categorisation process, a key direction for future
research is to explore whether making vices and
virtues more salient influences the magnitude of
the illusion. If, for example, participants engaged
in a task that either involved listing the virtues of
an eco-friendly building, or the vices of a conven-
tional building, then it is possible that evaluative
priming effects could be observed on the negative
footprint illusion if it indeed is underpinned by a
vice/virtue categorisation process. In other words,
increasing the salience of the virtues of eco-friendly
buildings should increase the magnitude of the
negative footprint illusion, while increasing the sal-
ience of the vices of conventional buildings should
diminish, or possibly reverse, the illusion.
In conclusion, converging evidence points to
averaging as the mechanism underpinning the
negative footprint illusion, resulting in a persuasive
bias that impairs people’s ratings of environmental
impact. Importantly, we demonstrate here that
this averaging bias is not inviolable. More specifi-
cally, we propose that summative priming can miti-
gate the negative footprint illusion. One
shortcoming of the present research should,
however, be noted: the negative footprint illusion
was eliminated but the participants were still
overall prone to a zero footprint illusion. That is,
although the direction of the means suggests that
participants in the summative priming were more
likely to make a summative operation for the critical
judgment, this was not significant at the group
level. Nevertheless, we contend that the current
research has the potential to influence and guide
future work aiming to clarify the ways in which
biases in environmental thinking and decision
making can be mitigated by means of training or
instructional interventions.
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